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ABSTRACT
The paper considers ways of avoiding a liquidity trap and ways of getting out of one.  Unless lower
short nominal interest rates are associated with significantly lower interest volatility, a lower average rate
of inflation, which will be associated with lower expected nominal interest rates, increases the odds that the
zero nominal interest rate floor will become a binding constraint.  The empirical evidence on this issue is
mixed.  
Once in a liquidity trap, there are two means of escape.  The first is to use expansionary fiscal
policy.  The second is to lower the zero nominal interest rate floor.  This second option involves paying
negative interest on government 'bearer bonds' -- coin and currency, that is 'taxing money', as advocated
by Gesell.  This would also reduce the likelihood of ending up in a liquidity trap.  Taxing currency amounts
to having periodic 'currency reforms', that is, compulsory conversions of 'old' currency into 'new' currency,
say by stamping currency.  The terms of the conversion can be set to achieve any positive or negative
interest rate on currency.  There are likely to be significant shoe leather costs associated with such schemes.
The policy question then becomes how much shoe leather it takes to fill an output gap?  
Finally the paper develops a simple analytical model showing how the economy can get into a
liquidity trap and how Gesell money is one way of avoiding it or escaping from it.
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The credible targeting of a low rate of inflation should result, on average,in low
nominal interest rates. The administratively determined zeronominal interest rate on
currency sets a floor under thenominal interest rate on non-monetary financial claims. An
important policy issue then is the following: how likelyis it that the economy ends up, as a
result of shocks or endogenous fluctuations, in a situation wherethe zero short nominal
interest floor becomes a binding constraint, that is, how likelyis the economy to end up in a
liquidity trap?
If low average nominal interest rates also tend to be stable rates,the risk of ending up
in a liquidity trap need not be enhanced much by targeting alow rate of inflation. The
empirical evidence on the relationship between thelevel and volatility of short nominal rates
is, however, mixed. The cross-sectional evidence supports a strongpositive correlation
between the average level of the short nominal interest rateand its (unconditional) variance.
The time-series evidence for the UK is ambiguous. At very high (daily)frequencies, the
correlation between the level of short sterling futures and a volatilityindex derived from short
sterling futures options is negative. At weekly frequencies,the correlation is positive for most
of the post-1975 period is positive, but the correlation is negativesince 1993, the beginning
of inflation targeting in the UK.
Once an economy lands itself in a liquidity trap, there are just two policyoptions.
The first is to wait for some positive shock to the excessdemand for goods and services,
brought about through expansionary fiscal measures or through exogenousshocks to private
domestic demand or to world demand. The second optionis to lower the zero nominal
interest rate floor on currency by taxing currency. A negativeinterest rate on currency would
also reduce the likelihood of an economy landing itself in a liquidity trap.The paper revisits a proposal by Gesell for implementing a negative nominal interest
rate on currency. Under this proposal, currency would cease to be current,and could be
subject to confiscation, unless a predetermined periodic paymentis made by the bearer to the
issuer. Currency would have become 'stamp scrip'. Another perspective on Gesell moneyis
to view it as involving periodic monetary reform, in which the conversion termsbetween old
and new currency define the own interest rate on currency.
The transactions and administrative costs associated with such periodic currency
reforms would be non-negligible. Such currency conversion costs could bereduced by
lengthening the interval between conversions, but they wouldremain significant. These
'shoe-leather costs' would have to be set against the risk of ending up in a liquidity trap,if a
very low rate of inflation is targetedwithout taxing currency, or against the cost of targeting a
higher rate of inflation. It may take a lot of shoe leather tofill an output gap or to rub out the
distortions associated with the inflation tax.
We then develop analyse the behaviour of a small analytical macroeconomicmodel in
which negative interest on currency is a policy option. In the Keynesian, sticky priceversion
of the model, there are two kinds of equilibria, 'normal' equilibriaand liquidity trap
equilibria. If the inflation rate falls to a sufficiently low level,the economy may end up in the
liquidity trap zone in which it will cycle permanently aroundthe liquidity trap steady state.
Imposing a negative interest rate on currency lowers thecritical rate of inflation at which the
economy enters the liquidity trap zone. Once caughtin the liquidity trap zone, a reduction in
the nominal interest rate on currency provides a means of escape.
If there are indeed benighted countries threatened by, or even caught in, a liquidity
trap, the policy makers there have one more option they mightwish to consider on its merits:
Gesell money.(I) Introduction
Liquidity trap talk is with us again. Liquidity traps may bewith us. An economy is
said to be in a liquidity trap when the ability to use monetary policy to stimulate demand has
vanished because the nominal interest rate has reached an unbreachable floor. The textbook
treatment of liquidity traps, based on Hickss [1936] interpretation of Keynes [1936],involves
the assumption that the demand for money becomes infinitely sensitive to the opportunity
cost of holding money, the spread between the pecuniary yield on some non-monetaryasset,
i, and the pecuniary own yield on money, M, at somelow level (typically zero) of that
opportunity cost. With portfolio holders indifferent a regardsthe composition of their
financial wealth between money and non-money assets, changes in the supplyof money
cannot affect the spread. Specifically, increases in the supplyof money cannot push the
spread below the level at which the demand for moneybecomes infinitely elastic.
The argument assumed that the pecuniary own rate of return on money was zero, an
appropriate assumption for coin and currency, although notfor the liabilities of private
deposit-taking institutions that make up most of the broader monetary aggregates,which now
typically have positive nominal returns.With the own rate of return on currency
administratively fixed at zero, a floor for the spread becomes a floorfor the nominal yield on
some non-monetary financial instrument, i, the shortnominal interest rate. l
When,as is institutionally more relevant, the shortnominal interest rate is taken to be
the monetary instrument, rather than some monetary aggregate, the argumentis not changed
in any essential way. Since money is, by assumption, the assetwith the highest non-
'With the nominal rate on currency fixed at zero, the nominal interest rate on otherfinancial
claims can be negative if the cost of holding and storing currency exceeds thatof holding and
storing these other claims (see Porter [1999]). This is unlikely tobe important quantitatively
and for expositional simplicity it is ignored in what follows.pecuniary rate of return, the equilibrium spread betweenthe pecuniary return on non-
monetary assets and that on money, has to be non-negative.The authorities therefore cannot
drive the short nominal interest rate below the pecuniary own rateof return on money. This
is zero if (some component of) money is non-interest-bearing.Non-interest-bearing coin and
currency therefore prevent the shortnominal interest rate on non-monetary financial claims
from falling below zero. This produces liquidity trap at (or possiblyabove) a zero nominal
rate of interest.
This liquidity trap used to be treated, in the mainstream accountsof the monetary
transmission mechanism, as a theoretical curiosum without practicalrelevance.2 The revival
of interest in the liquidity trap is not surprising. First, Japanis in a protracted economic
slump. Short nominal interest rates there are near zero.Zero is the absolute nominal interest
rate floor in Japan because yen notes and coin bear a zeronominal interest rate. Monetary
policy in Japan currently appears to have a verylimited effect on aggregate demand. The
conclusion that there is a liquidity trap at work is hard toresist (see e.g. Krugman
[1998a,b,c,d; 1999], Ito 111998] and McKiimonand Ohno [1999]); for a view that liquidity
traps are unlikely to pose a problem, seeMeltzer [1999]).
Second, inflation in Euroland is below one percent per annum.The official short rate
now 3is 2.5percent.Euroland economic activity is slowing down. This raises the question as
to whether a margin of two hundred and fifty basis points providesenough insurance against
a slump. Demand could weaken to such an extentthat a cut in the short nominal rate of more
than two hundred and fifty points would be required to boost aggregatedemand sufficiently
22Seee.g. Romer [1996], which coversthe topic as half of an exercise at the end of the
chapter 5,"TraditionalKeynesian Theories of Fluctuations".
June 1999.The monetary instrument is, almost invariably, a short nominal interestrate.4
Aggregate demand is influenced primarily by real interest rates, shortand long, that is, by
nominal interest rates corrected for (expected) changes in the purchasing powerof money.
The transmission of monetary policy through other real asset prices, includingthe real
exchange rate, depends on the ability of the monetary authorities toinfluence real interest
rates. For the monetary authority to affect real demand, changesin nominal interest rates
have to be translated, at least temporarily, into changes in real interest rates.In a moderate or
low-inflation environment, inflation and inflation expectations tend to move only gradually
and sluggishly. This Keynesian feature of the economy gives monetary policy a temporary
handle on the real economy.
If short nominal interest rates cannot fall any further, short real rates can onlybe
pushed down if there is a rise in the expected rate of inflation.If the price stability gospel has
been widely internalised by market participants, expected inflationis unlikely to rise to
produce the required cut in real rates.
Once an economy is in such a situation, it is not possible to get outof it using the
conventional monetary policy instruments -changesin the short nominal interest rates.
Inflation expectations are not a policy instrument. Why would inflation expectationsrise
when monetary policy cannot stimulate demand? It is a trap -aninefficient equilibrium.
Conventional monetary policy advice then can only be preventive, not curative:do not get
4The argument could be recast in terms of the monetary authority using some monetary
aggregate as the instrument, with the short nominalinterest rate on risk-free non-monetary
financial claims treated as endogenous. Taking the short nominal rate as the instrumenthas
two advantages. First, the exposition in simpler. Second,it is what central banks actually do.
Changes in reserve requirements, open market operations etc. arebest viewed as ways of
changing the interest rate. .In an open economy, the other institutionallyrelevant instrument
of monetary policy is the nominal exchange rate. When capital mobilityis limited, the short
nominal interest rate and the nominal exchange rate both can be instrumentsof policy, at any
rate in the short run.into this situation.5 Make sure inflation expectations (and actual inflation) aretargeted at a
level high enough to ensure that nominal interest rates will nothit the floor, even during
periods during which aggressively expansionary monetary policyis in order.
Of course, in a liquidity trap, expansionary fiscal policy, or anyother exogenous
shock to aggregate demand, is supposed to be at its mosteffective. There are, however,
conditions under which fiscal policy cannot be used to stimulate aggregatedemand. Debt-
financed lump-sum tax cuts could fail to stimulate aggregate demandif there is Ricardian
equivalence or debt neutrality. Alternatively, the government'screditworthiness may be so
impaired that it cannot borrow. Finally, therecould be external, Maastricht Treaty or
Stability and Growth Pact-like external constraints on a government'sability to use deficit
financing.
If Ricardian equivalence holds, a temporary increase inexhaustive public spending
will, even with a balanced budget, and in virtually anymodel of the economy, boosts
aggregate demand. For this fiscal policychannel also to be ineffective, exhaustive public
spending must be a direct perfect substitute forexhaustive private spending, say because
public consumption is a perfect substitute for private consumptionin private utility functions,
and public investment is a perfect substitute for private investmentin private production
functions. 6
Ifexpansionary fiscal policy can be used to work the economyout of a liquidity trap,
the problem is clearly rather less pressing. In what follows, itis assumed that this option is
not available.
5This advice is a variant on the following familiar dialogue. Question:"How do I get there
from here?" Answer: "I would not start from here".
6See Buiter [19771.(II) Can the zero nominal interest ratefloor become binding in
the UK?
Most estimates of the current level of the long real interest rate in the UK putit
somewhere between 2.0 and 3.0 percent per annum. Figures 1 and 2 showthe recent




With an inflation target of 2.5percentper annum (as in the UK), the long-runnominal
interest rate (ignoring term- and risk premia) would be between4.5and5.5percentper
annum. In steady state, the short-term nominal interestrate would also be between 4.5and
5.5percentper annum. We can regardthis as the 'normal' level of the short nominal interest
rate. If one believed that there were contingencies (such as adramatic, spontaneous collapse
of aggregate demand) under which a cut in short rates of morethan 4.5to5.5 percent would
be in order, the monetary authority would be at risk of hitting the zerointerest floor.
Historically, in the UK, there have been occasions whenBank Rate has swung by
more than 4.5or5.5percentagepoints. On 15 November 1979, the Bank's Minimum
Lending Rate hit 17.00 percent. On March 11, 1981, it stood at12.00 percent. On October 6,
1989, the Bank's Minimum Band 1 Dealing Rate stood at14.88 percent. On 8 February1994, it was down to 5.13 percent. Clearly, very large swingsin Bank Rate, in excess of the
4.5 or 5.5 percent 'safety margin' associated with a 2.5 percent inflation targetand a 2.0 to 3.0
percent long real interest rate, have occurred inthe past.
The emphasis should, however, be on 'in the past'. These very large cuts inBank Rate
invariably took place from a very high level of ratesassociated with prior macroeconomic
mismanagement, generally an inflationary surge thatthreatened to get out of control (or had
indeed done so) or the desperate defence of an overvalued exchange rate peg. Figure3 shows
the behaviour of Bank Rate, the inflation rate and the sterling-US$ exchangerate for the UK
in the post-World War II period.
Figure 3 here
Neither situation applies today. Nor should it apply again if the politicalcommitment
to low and stable inflation and its institutional expressionin an operationally independent
central bank remain intact.
The longer-term historical record can also be viewed as encouraging.The UK got
through the period 1800-1914 without ever landingitself in a liquidity trap. As Figure 4
shows, the average rate of inflation over this 115-year period wasslightly negative and the
variability of the inflation rate was high. Figure 5 shows thatBank Rate did not fall below 2
per cent throughout 115 years precedingWorld-War I.
Figure 4 here
7Jenny Salvage prepared Figures 1 through 5.
The temporary collapse in the external value of the U.S. dollar starting in1861 is American
Civil War related.Figure 5 here
There is a marked positive association, over time and acrosscountries, between the
level of the inflation rate and its variability (see Okun [1971, 1975], Taylor[1981], Ball and
Cecchetti [19901). If such a relationship were to be found alsobetween the level of short
nominal rates and their variability or volatility, it wouldfurther reduce the likelihood of
ending up in a liquidity trap in an environmentwith sustained low inflation and therefore, on
average, with low nominal interest rates.
As will become apparent, the available statistical evidence onthe association between
the level and volatility of short-term nominal interest ratesis mixed. It is indeed very
difficult to offer a convincing test of our prior belief, thatit is hard to conceive of situations in
which the zero nominal interest rate floor would become a bindingconstraint on monetary
policy in the UK, with the current symmetricannual inflation target of 2.5 percent.
In principle, one could try to test this hypothesis by estimating adynamic stochastic
process for the short nominalinterest rate, using either time series or Markov chainmodels.
If one were brave enough to make distributional assumptionsabout the disturbances in this
process, it would be possible tocalculate the odds on the short nominal rate fallingbelow
zero, given the starting valuesof the process. We do indeed make some attemptsin this
direction, but our efforts must be accompanied by aclear health warning.
There is an obvious, and in our view virtually insurmountable, problemwith any
assessment, based on historical data, of theodds that the non-negativity constraint on short
nominal rates will become binding. During the sample,markets undoubtedly were operating
under the assumption that short nominal rates could neverfall below zero. In the UK over thepast 200 years, the annual Bank Rate series indeed never fell below2 percent. With the
support of the empirical distribution of nominal short ratestruncated from below at zero, the
historical interest rate record is unlikely to be informative about the odds on the economy
getting into a liquidity trap in the future, since this would require astructural break in the
interest rate process, about which the sample is uninformative. If we were to assume
(counterfactually, as can be seen from Figures 7 and 8) that the distributionof Bank Rate or
of the error term in the Bank Rate equation is normal, there will always be a positive
probability that Bank rate will go negative. If we assume insteadthat the distributions in
question are, say, lognormal, the probability of breaching the zerofloor (even asymptotically)
is a-priori constrained to be zero. We try to circumvent this by calculatingthe asymptotic
confidence bands for Bank Rate reported below from the empirical distributionof the sample
residuals. Since the empirical distribution of the residuals obviously has finite support,this
procedure will, if anything, underestimate the likelihoodof the economy ending up in a
liquidity trap.
Even ignoring the unavoidable small-sample problems, this procedure isvulnerable to
the following criticism. What we are interested in estimating is the probabilitythat the
interest rate would have had to be negative (or below the possibly positive liquidity trap
level) in order to avoid the economy getting into a liquidity trap equilibrium.If the economy
had been in a liquidity trap in the sample, the data would reflect the liquidity trap
configuration of the economy, including the response of real activityand inflation that
supported the liquidity trap floor as an equilibrium.Information on the 'deep' structural
parameters of the model (the invariant parameters governing moneydemand and its
determinants) is necessary to recover the 'first passage' probabilitiesinto the liquidity trap
region of the economy.What do the data tell us about the statistical association between the leveland
volatility of the short nominal interest rate? The very high-frequencyassociation between
short nominal sterling rates and a measure of volatility derived from short sterlingfutures
over the period 1987-1999 is shown in Figure 6. Theassociation between the level of short
sterling and its volatility is, if anything, weakly negative.
Figure 6 here
The slightly lower frequency time-series evidence on the associationbetween the
level of short nominal interest rate and a statistical measure of its variability usingweekly
data is also mixed. Table 1 shows the time series record for the UKfor the period 1997-1999.
Table 1 here
For the whole period 1975-1999, volatility and level of the threemonth interbank rate
are positively contemporaneously correlated, but forthe post-inflation targeting period 1993-
1999, the correlation is slightly negative. The statisticalmodel that generated the conditional
variance measure used in Table 1 can be found in Appendix 2. Wealso provide an estimate
of the steady state (long-run) value of the three month interbank rate implied bythe statistical
model, together with 95% steady state confidence bands for threemonth interbank rate.
We also investigated the statistical properties of Bank Rate at significantlylower
frequencies, using a 200 year time series of annualobservations. Our time series model
(described in Appendix 2) implies a strong positivecorrelation (0.81) between the level of
Base Rate and its contemporaneous conditional variance. Table 2 plots thelevel of Base Rateand our estimates of its conditional variance. We also provide an estimate of the steady state
(long-run) value of Base rate implied by the statistical model, togetherwith 95% steady state
confidence bands for Base Rate.
Table 2 here
The confidence bands were calculated using the distribution of the estimated sample
residuals. Not surprisingly, the distribution of sample residuals is distinctlynon-normal. The
same holds for Base rate itself. Figure 7 shows the frequencydistribution of Base Rate and
Figures 8 and 9 those of the estimated interest rate residuals.The sample distribution of Bank
Rate is significantly skewed to the right. Its empirical distribution is truncatedfrom below at
2.0 percent. The distribution of the sample residuals from the two maininterest rate models




Krugman 1998d] has suggested that deflation (negative inflation)makes a liquidity
trap more likely. This is indeed an implication ofjustabout any model of liquidity traps,
including the model we develop in Section IV of this paper. Wetherefore estimate a simple
time series process for annual RPI inflation over the 200 year period, and for itsconditionalvariance. The results are reported in Table 3, together with its estimated steady state value
and steady state 95%confidenceintervals. The statistical inflation model is described in
Appendix 2. Surprisingly, the contemporaneous correlation betweeninflation and its
conditional variance turns out to be negative.
Table 3 here
The steady state confidence intervals for the annual rate of RPI inflation show that
there is quite a large probability of deflation. Before one gets too worried about this,three
points should be kept in mind. First, the relationship betweeninterest rates and expected
inflation depends on the behaviour of the inflation risk premium. Second, the UK
experienced negative trend inflation and short bouts of sharpdeflation in the 19thcentury,
without landing itself in a liquidity trap. Third, the monetary policy target in the UK is,since
June 1997, a symmetric inflation target. Deviations of inflation below the 2.5percenttarget
are to be avoided as much as deviations above that target.The risk of sharp deflation is
therefore diminished. The new monetary regime has been in operation for tooshort a period,
however, for this to show up as a structural break in the inflation timeseries process.
McKinnon and Ohno [1999] have argued that, at any rate in the Japanese case, a large
expected appreciation of the currency could create a liquidity trap.We investigated the
likelihood of a sharp appreciation of sterling by using almost 200 years of £I$exchangerate
data to estimate a simple stochastic process for the proportional rate of depreciationof the
exchange rate and its conditional variance. The results are reportedin Table 4, together with
the expected long-run sterling depreciation rate and the 95% asymptotic confidenceintervals.
The statistical model underlying these calculations is described in Appendix 2. Thecontemporaneous correlation between exchange rate depreciation and itsconditional variance
is low but negative.
Table 4 here
It suggests that, based on this particular statistical model, there is quite a significant
probability of a sizeable appreciation of sterling. Again, the caveatabout the dangers of
ignoring risk premia applies. It is surprising that our simplestatistical model appears to
handle such episodes as the American Civil War, two World Wars and the Great Depression
of the Thirties quite well.
Finally, Table 5reportscross-sectional evidence on the relationship between the level
of short nominal rates and their volatility based on a sample of .59 countriesbetween 1989
and 1998. The source of the data is IFS.9 The correlation between the twovariables is very
high at 0.89, suggesting that across countries high short-termnominal rates are accompanied
by high unconditional variances.
Table 5here
On balance, the data fail to offer convincing support either for or againstthe
contention that a regime of low short nominal interest rates is likely to be a regimeof stable
short nominal interest rates.This is therefore not unambiguously good news, nor
unambiguously bad news for a policy maker targeting low inflation, althoughthe current UK
target would seem to provide quite handsome roomfor monetary manoeuvre. Two hundred
would like to thank Nick Hanchard for preparing this Table.years of UK monetary history also favour the contention that liquidity traps areunlikely to
become a policy concern.
(III) Options for avoiding a liquidity trap
The lower the inflation target, and, if it is credible, the lower the underlying rateof
inflation, the narrower is the 'safe range' above the zero floor for the shortnominal rate. A
credible target of zero inflation, would, with the long real rate at 2.0 to 3.0 percent,reduce the
safe range to 2.0 to 3.0 percent.
Does this mean that targeting zero inflation would be a high-risk strategy?There
would be risks if, despite a credible commitment to zero inflation, the economy is likelyto be
hit by shocks that would make interest rate cuts of more than 200 or 300basis points
desirable. If fiscal policy cannot be used to escape from the liquidity trap andif the risk of
ending up in a trap is considered unacceptable, two options remain.
Raising the inflation target
The first option is to accept the nominal interest rate floor as immutable, and to target
a rate of inflation high enough to reduce to acceptablelevels the risk of hitting the zero
interest floor. This would have to be done before the country gets into a liquidity trap.
Targeting a higher rate of inflation after you are caught in the trapwould be like pushing
toothpaste back into the tube. All one can do is hope and wait forfiscal policy, or some other
shock to aggregate demand, to boost the economy out of the trap.
Lowering the nominal interest rate floor: stamping moneya Ia GesellThe only other option is to stick to the inflation target but to lower thefloor on the
nominal interest rate. A floor below zero would reduce the likelihood thatthe floor would
ever become a binding constraint on policy. In addition,the option of further lowering the
floor, would provide a mechanism for escaping from a liquidity trap evenafter a country had
been caught in it.
That nominal interest rate floor at zero is not a God-givenimmovable barrier. It is the
result of a policy choice -thedecision by governments or central banks to set the
administered nominal interest rate on coin and currency at zero,rather than at some other
(negative) level. Coin and currency are governmentbearerbonds'°.A bearer bond is a debt
°Bearersecurities are securities for which ownership is established by possession,without
any need for registering title, Thus, abearer bond is a bond with no owner information
attached to it. The legal presumption is that the bearer is the owner.If the issuer of the bond
is credit-worthy, they are almost as liquid and transferable ascash. Cash (coin and currency)
is a special case of a zero interest (or zero-coupon) bearerbond issued by the state (generally
through the central bank). Currency can be viewed as a zero couponbearer consol or bearer
perpetuity, since it can be interpreted as having aninfinite maturity.. (It is always amusing
to ask a finance expert to price a zero coupon perpetuityin a world where positive coupon
perpetuities co-exist). In Appendix 1, we argue thatit may be more informative to view
currency as a zero couponjinite maturitybearer bond, which is issued and redeemed at par,
with redemption taking the form of the one-for-one exchangeof old currency for new
currency which is indistinguishablefrom the old currency.
The vast majority of 'international bonds', historically called'eurobonds' are bearer. Bearer
bonds can take two main forms. First, the traditional 'definitive' style,where the bonds
literally are individual pieces of security-printed paperin denominations of, say, $10,000,
which individual holders bring in to paying agents so as to receive paymentof interest and
principals. Second, 'global' bonds, which are technicallybearer instruments but consist of a
single piece of paper representing the entire issue (and soworth hundreds of millions or even
billions of dollars). In practice, the terms of the global bond saythat only Euroclear (the
settlement system based in Brussels) or Cedelbank (the settlement systembased in
Luxembourg) are entitled to the proceeds of the global bond,and that Euroclear and
Cedelbank will in turn divide the proceeds up amongst the end-investorswhose details are
stored in their electronic records. Thus the global bond is not aninstrument which in practice
can be passed from one owner to another, even thoughit is technically 'bearer'. Effectively
the bonds are dematerialised.
Bearer bonds are legal and quite common in the UK. Whilethe bearer debenture went out of
use, replaced by the non-negotiabledebenture or debenture stock, transferable (in the samesecurity in paper form whose ownership is transferred by deliveryrather than by written
notice and amendment to the register of ownership. We shall refer to all bonds that are not
bearer bonds as registered bonds. Bearer bonds are negotiable, just as e.g. money market
instruments such as Treasury Bills, bank certificates of deposit, and bills of exchange are
negotiable. A financial instrument is negotiable if it is transferablefrom one person to
another by being delivered with or without endorsement so that the title passes tothe
transferee.1' Coin and currency therefore are bearer bonds. They are obligationsof the
government, made payable not to a named individual orother legal entity, but to whoever
happens to present it for payment -thebearer. Coin and currency have three further
distinguishing properties: they are government bearerbonds with infinite maturities
(perpetuities or consols)'2; their coupon payments (whichdefine the own (or nominal) rate of
way as common stocks) by entry inthe company's register, a number of new negotiable
investment securities have evolved. They include the modern bearer bond,the negotiable
certificate of deposit, and the floating rate note. A limited number of gutshave also been
issued with a bearer option.
Before July 1983, municipal securities in the U.S. were issued for the most partin certificate
form with coupons attached. Some of these so-called old-style bearerbonds are still available
in the marketplace. The issuer has no record of who owns these bonds.The owner clips the
coupons and collects the interest fromthe issuer's paying agent. Transferring the bonds
requires physical delivery and payment. Bearer bonds issued by municipalauthorities were
made illegal in the U.S. in 1982 (no doubt because they provided ideal investmentsfor those
who did not welcome close examination of their financial position). Bearerbonds with a
negative interest rate are especially awkward to administer,because inducing the bearer to
present the issuer with coupons obliging the bearer tomake a payment to the issuer presents
non-trivial enforcement problems. This creates the need for mechanisms such asthe
compulsory conversion of old cash into new cash (on terms implying a negativenominal
interest rate), backed by the credible threat of confiscation of the old cash, asdiscussed in the
body of the paper.
IIKeyelements of negotiability include the following: (1) transfer by physical delivery; (2)
transfer is such as to confer upon its holder unchallengeable title and (3) a negotiable
instrument benefits from a number of evidential and procedural advantagesin the event of a
court action.
2 seeFoonote 9 and Appendix one on a different interpretation.interest on coin and currency) are zero, and they are legal tender (they cannot berefused in
final settlement of any obligation).
There are two reasons why interest is not paid on currency.
13Thefirst and currently
less important one, has to do with the attractions of seigniorage (issuingnon-interest-bearing
monetary liabilities) as a source of government revenuein a historical environment of
positive short nominal rates on non-monetary governmentdebt.'4
The second, and more important, reason why no interest is paid on coinand currency,
are the practical, administrative difficulties of paying a negativeinterest rate on bearer bonds.
It can be done, but it cannot be done elegantly. Significant 'shoe leather' costs areinvolved.
There is no practical or administrative barrier to paying negativenominal
interest rates (market-determined or administered) on those privatefinancial instruments or
on government interest-bearing securities that are notbearer bonds but have registered
owners.'5 The reason is that, for registered securities, whether issued by private or public
agents, the identities of both the issuer and theholder (the debtor and the creditor) are easily
established. This makes it easy to verify whether interest due has been paidand received, be
it at a positive or at a negative rate. Thus the non-bearer bond partof the monetary base, that
is, banks' balances with the central bank, could earn a negativenominal interest rate without
any technical problems. For these balances,the debtor (the central bank) and the creditor (the
13 hereon, 'currency' will be taken to includeboth coin and currency. There obviously
are more severe technical problems with attaching coupons or stampsto coin than to currency
notes.
14140f course, issuing negative interest-bearing monetary liabilities wouldbe even more
attractive, from a seigniorage point of view.
'5The only exception is that it would not be possible to have a consol or perpetuitywith a
negative nominal interest rate. Assume the constantnominal coupon payment of the consol is
positive. If the infinite sequence of short nominal rates is negative,the value of the consol
would be unbounded positive. A negative coupon would yield an unbounded negativevalue
for the consol.commercial bank) are easily identified.Positive interest payments or negative interest
payments just involve simple book-keeping transactions,debit or credit, between known
parties.
We will highlight the technical, administrative problem with paying negativeinterest
on bearer bonds (be they private or public) is by consideringthe problems of paying a
negative coupon on the bearer bond part of the central bank's monetaryliabilities, coin and
currency. While the identity of the issuer (the debtor,that is the Central Bank) is easily
verified, the identity of the holder (the creditor) is not. There is no obligationto register title
to currency in order to establish ownership. Possession effectively providescomplete title.
This creates problems for paying any non-zero interest rate, becauseit is difficult to verify
whether a particular note or coin has already been credited ordebited with interest. With
verifiability of interest payments, currency could be turnedinto an interest-bearing bearer
bond, and the interest rate could be negative (or positive),if circumstances required this.
The problem of verifying whether interest due on bearer bondshas been paid is
present, in a milder form, even when the interest rateis positive. However, the problem of
getting the (anonymous) owner of the currency to comeforward to claim his positive coupon
receipt from the government is much less acute thanthe problem of getting the (anonymous)
owner to come forward to make a payment to the government.In both cases, however, each
individual monetary claim has to be marked, or identified clearly, as being'current', that is, as
having all interest due paid or received. Without suchclear marking, positive interest-bearing
money could be presented repeatedlyfor interest payment. Historically, the problem of
paying positive coupons on bearer bonds wassolved by attaching coupons or stamps to the
title certificate of the bearer bond. When claiming his periodic coupon payment,theappropriate coupon was physically removed ('clipped') from thetitle certificate and retained
by the issuer. Clipping coupons used to be a popular pastime amonginvestors.'6
Without further amendment, the 'coupon clipping' or stamping routewould not work
for bearer bonds with negative coupons. The enforcement problemsinvolved in getting the
unregistered, anonymous holders of the negative couponbearer bonds to come forward to pay
the issuer would be insurmountable. The only practical way aroundthis problem, is to make
the bearer bond subject to an expiration date and a conversion procedure.In the case of
currency, this could be achieved by periodicallyattaching coupons or stamps to currency,
without which the currency would cease to be 'current'.
For currency to cease to be 'current', it is not enough forthe monetary authority to
declare that after a certain date, tj,currencyissued before another date to< tj shallcease to
be legal tender. Being legal tender certainly enhances theattractiveness of currency as a store
of value, medium of exchange and means of payment, butthese advantages need not be
enough to induce holders of 'old' currency, whichis about to lose its legal tender status, to
come forward and exchange it, at a price, for'new' currency which does have legal tender
status. What serves as medium of exchange and meansof payment is socially determined.
Being legal tender is but one among manyconsiderations that induce people to use certain
classes of objects as means of payment and medium of exchange.For currency to cease to be
current, it effectively has to be subject to confiscationif the appropriate coupon or stamp has
not been attached. In other words, there have to be periodic 'monetaryreforms'7.
There is a long tradition on the crankier fringes of theeconomics profession of
proposals for taxing money or taxing liquidity,which is another way of describing negative
16 attaching the coupons to the ownership certificatewould not work for consols
(perpetuities), as certificates of infinite size would beawkward stores of value.interest-bearing currency. Many of these proposals were partof wider, and generally hare-
brained, schemes for curing the world's economic andsocial ills. The mechanics of taxing
currency are straightforward main-streameconomics, however.
The best-known proponent of taxing currency was probablySilvio Gesell (1862-
1930), a GermanlArgentineafl businessmanand economic scribbler of suspect political
judgement, but admired by Keynes, who wroteof him "I believe that the future will learn
more from the spirit of Gesell than fromthat of Marx" (Keynes [1936, p. 355]). Gesell
wanted to stimulate the circulation of money by gettingthe state to issue money that, like
capital assets, depreciated in value.'8 Ifinflation could not be relied upon to do the job of
making holding money unattractive, an alternative was "StampScrip" -datedbills that would
lose a certain percentage of value each year unless new stampswere put on them. Stamp
Scrip was actually issued briefly during the Great Depressionof the Thirties in parts of the
Canadian province of Alberta by the Social Credit provincial governmentof the day. 'The
scheme was a resounding failure, not least becausethe provincial government in the end
17
Appendix1 contains a slightly more formal discussion of the paymentof negative interest
on currency.
18Gesell'smotivation was not, as far as we can determine, the avoidanceof or escape from
liquidity traps. His aim was to eliminate theinterest component of costs and prices
completely from the economic system, not just inthe extreme circumstances of the liquidity
trap, but as a permanent feature. Our readingof his works suggest that he was a bit vague
about the distinction between real and nominal interest rates.While, by stamping currency,
the nominal interest rate on non-monetary assets canindeed be brought down to zero (or to
any other level), the endogeneityof the rate of inflation means that the ability of the monetary
authorities to influence the long-run real interest rate ismuch more doubtful. The formal
model analysed in Section IV of this paper has the propertythat the monetary authorities
cannot influence the long-run real interest rate.
In August 1935 the first social credit government waselected in the Canadian province of
Alberta. While its ideology owed more to the writingsof two other great economic cranks,
Alfred Richard Orage [1917] and Major Clifford Hugh Douglas [1919](and to the personal
involvement of the latter as economic adviser to the provincial government),the Alberta
Prosperity Certificates introduced in 1936 byPremier William Aberhart, were pure Gesell.
Similar in appearance to a dollar bill, the certificates required a weeklyendorsement of a 2crefused to accept its own scrip in payment.2° Similar local currency experiments weretried in
Worgi, Austria during the 1930s.
Thus, for negative interest on bearer bonds such as currencyto be enforceable, the
bearer bond has to expire after a certain date. The desired (negative or positive)interest rate
on currency would be determined by the terms onwhich the old, expiring currency could be
exchanged with the central bank for new currency.The 'conversion' could be effected by
stamping the old currency, or by issuing completely new currencywhich was verifiably
distinct from the old currency.
Taxing currency (or paying negative interest on currency)through expiration of old
currency and conversion into new currency canbe visualised as follows. After the expiration
date, tj ,theissuer (the central bank) or its agents can confiscate theold currency without
compensation.2' Provided the forces of the law are strong enough,this could induce holders
of the old currency to convert it, at a price, on or beforethe expiration date, rather than
continue to use it in transactions or as a store of value after the expirationdate and risk having
it confiscated. At fixed intervals of length & (Gesell periods, say)whose duration could, for
convenience, be set at a year (or several years, in order toreduce conversion costs), and on a
specific day, (Gesell day), old currency would legallyrevert to the issuer (the central bank).
After Gesell day, the old currency has no value (because of thecredible threat of confiscation)
stamp, amounting to a 104 percentannual capital levy (see Hutchinson and Burkitt [1997]
and Mallory [1954]).
201t also had failed to convince the Federal governmentin Ottawa to match its negative
interest rates. Since Federal currency was at least as useful as a meansof payment, this
would require to scrip to trade at a discount with respect tothe Federal currency and to
appreciate vis-à-vis the federal currency at a ratethat compensated for the interest differential
between Federal and provincial currency.
21Less drastic penalties might work also. For instance, old moneyfound in circulation after
its 'expiry' date would be forcibly converted into new money atthe rate offered on the
conversion date, but subject to an additional penalty. The confiscationscenario makes the
key point very clearly, however.and will not be used in transactions or as a store of value. On Gesell day, 1£worth of new
currency would be issued in exchangefor et£sworth of old currency, where 1M would be
the policy-determined (instantaneous) nominal interest rate on currency.22For simplicity, we
assume iMto be constant, although it could be time-varying.The nominal rate of interest on
currency would be administratively determined,that is, set by the central bank. To avoid
long queues at the central bank's conversion offices onGesell days, earlier exchanges of old
for new money might be allowed at the rate of 1£worth of the new currency for
Jti'ls " £sworth of the old currency, where tj is the date of the next Gesell day, te￿ t1
is the time before the next Gesell day on which the old currencyis exchanged for the new,
and i is the instantaneous nominal interest rate on the government's non-monetaryliabilities.
For currency to remain rate-of-return-dominated as a storeof value, it is necessary that
1M<j•Both rates could be negative, and may have to be, if liquidity traps areto be ruled
out. Coin and currency would effectively becometime-limited, finite maturity financial
claims.
New currency could, in principle, be used in transactionsbefore midnight on the
Gesell day before they are formally introduced. During thisearlier Gesell period, the value of
the old currency in terms of the co-existing new currencywould decline steadily. The
relative value of the old currency in terms of the new currencywould change at an
instantaneous rate M ,soas to ensure that, at the moment the old currency expiresand the
new currency comes in officially (at midnight onGesell day), there is no discrete jump in the
22e'' — Iwould be the effective (Gesell) period tax rate on currency. Theinstantaneous tax
rate would be —IM.value of old money in terms of new money, or of goods and services in terms of money.23 It
follows that, during the period of coexistence of old and new money, the rate ofinflation of
the prices of goods and services would be higher in terms of old money than forin terms of
money, with the excess of the old moneyinflation rate over the new money inflation rate
equal to -M• If the coexistence of two currencies is thought tobe confusing, one could try to
enforce a ban on the use of new currency in transactions before its Gesell day.
Clearly there are costs associated with such a scheme, evenif one can come up with a
slightly higher-tech (and tamper-proof) alternative to physically stamping currency.These
shoe leather costs have to be set against the benefits of removingthe zero floor on the
nominal interest rate.
There are costs (and benefits) other than shoe-leather costsassociated with taxing
currency. Taxing currency would be regressive,since only the relatively poor hold a
significant fraction of their wealth in currency. Taxing currencywould, however, have the
nice feature of constituting a tax on the grey, black and outrightcriminal economies, which
are heavily cash-based.
(IV)ASimple Model of the Escape from a LiquidityTrap
Through Gesell Money
We model a simple, closed endowment economy with a single perishable commoditythat can
be consumed privately or publicly.
Households
23Thisis just like the ex-dividend price of a share of common stock being equal, onthe day
the dividend is paid, to the dividend-inclusive price of the stock minusthe dividend. In our
example, the dividend would be negativeA representative infinite-lived, competitive consumer maximises for all I￿ 0 the
utility functional given in (1) subject to his instantaneous budget identity (2),solvency
constraint (3) and his initial financial wealth. We use the simplest money-in-the-direct-
utility-function approach to motivate a demand for money despiteit being dominated as a
store of value. We define the following notation; c is real privateconsumption, y is real
output, r is real (lump-sum taxes), Mis the nominalstock of base money (currency), B is the
nominal stock of zero maturity non-monetary debt, i is the instantaneousrisk-free nominal
interest rate on non-monetary debt, M is the instantaneous risk-freenominal interest rate on
money, p is the price level in terms of money, ais the real stock of private financial wealth, m





c￿ 0; M ￿ 0
lime51 u{M() +B(v)]￿ 0 (3)




the household budget identity (2) can be rewritten as follows
âra+y_r_c+(iM_i)m (6)where r, the instantaneous real rate of interest on non-monetary assets, is defined as
r—i—7i (7)
and r is the instantaneous rate of inflation.
p
The household solvency constraint can now be rewritten as
urnejt:tta(v) ￿ 0 (8)
v —pCo
andthe intertemporal budget constraint for the household sector can be rewritten as:
CoJVr(u)du
St e {c(v) +r(v)+[z(v)-
1M
(v)]m(v) -y(v)]dv￿ a(t) (9)





II' <lM currency would dominate non-monetary financial assets ('bonds') as a
store of value. Households would wish to take infinite long positionsin money, financed by
infinite short positions in non-monetary securities. The rate of return onthe portfolio would
be infinite. This cannot be an equilibrium.
=currencyand bonds are perfect substitutes as stores of value. Because of the
direct utility of money, the equilibrium will be the Friedman equilibrium,characterised by
satiation in money. With the logarithmic utility function, satiation occurs onlywhen the
stock of money is infinite (relative to the finite consumption level). Providedthe authoritiesprovide government money and absorb private bonds in the right (infinite) amounts,this can
be an equilibrium.
There is a continuum of identical consumers whose aggregate measure isnormalised
to 1. The individual relationships derived in this sectiontherefore also characterise the
aggregate behaviour of the consumers.
Government
The budget identity of the consolidated general government and centralbank is given
in (12). The level of real public consumption is denoted g ￿ 0.
If+3=—_iB+iM+p(g—r) (12)
Again, the initial nominal value of the government'sfinancial liabilities is
predetermined
M(0) +B(0)=A(0)
This budget identity can be rewritten as
aEra+g_r+(i—i)m (13)
The government solvency constraint is
_5(u)du lime a(v) ￿ 0 (14)




Government consumption spending is exogenous. To ensure that publicconsumption
spending does not exceed total available resources, >0,we therefore have to impose
gzy
Witha representative consumer, this model willexhibit debt neutrality or Ricardian
equivalence. Without loss of generality, we therefore assumethat the government's solvencyconstraint is always satisfied because lump-sum taxes are continuously adjusted to keepthe




Monetary policy is specified as an exogenous valuefor the nominal interest rate on
currency and either an exogenous valuefor the short nominal interest rate on non-monetary
financial claims or an exogenous value of the initial nominal moneystock and a subsequent
exogenous growth rate of the nominal moneystock. In either case, the short nominal bond
rate is required to be no lower than the short nominal rate on currency.






!1(t)=(t),t ￿ 0 (19)
M(t)
i(t)￿iM,
I will only consider in detail the case where the short nominalbond rate is the
instrument. The case where the nominal money stock path is theinstrument only involves
trivial amendments to the earlier analysis.
Equilibrium and the liquidity trap with full employmentIn the full-employment, flexible price version of the model, output always equalsthe
exogenously given level of capacity output,Therefore
c+g=y=y (20)
The equilibrium instantaneous real interest rate is given by
(21) cy cg
For simplicity, let g =0.Let the exogenous growth rate of capacity output be denoted
n(t) -.Itfollows that the equilibrium instantaneous real rate of interest simplifiesto
y
r(t) =S+n(t) (22)







Note from (22) and (23), that
i(t) =8+n(t)+r(t) (27)
When the short nominal bond rate is exogenous (equation (18)),the model exhibits
price level indeterminacy. Since the behaviourof real money balances, the inflation rate and
the nominal and real interest rates are not affected by this,and since the conditions under
which a liquidity trap occurs or its consequences are notaffected by the nominal
indeterminacy, no further attention is paid to this issue.In the flexible price level version of the model, the equilibrium real interest rate and
real private consumption sequences are the same when the economy is in a liquidity trap as
when it isn't. The liquidity trap matters here only because is may stop the economy from
achieving an inflation target. Of course, in the model under consideration, the welfare
motivation for an inflation target is not obvious. Pareto-efficiency requires that the economy
be satiated with real money balances, that is, that i =M AllPareto-efficient equilibria are
therefore liquidity trap equilibria.
Whatever the motivation for the inflation target, it is clear that a liquidity trap may
prevent the authorities from achieving the target. Let r *bethe target rate of inflation,
assumed constant.
From (26) and (27),itfollows that an inflation target cannot be achieved if
(28)
Since8>0, a non-negative inflation target can be achieved, even with the nominal
interest rate on currency at zero, unless the growth rate of capacity output were sufficiently
negative. This hardly seems a serious concern. Nevertheless, equation (28) makes it clear,
that an inflation target is always achievable, if the authorities set the nominal interest rate on
currency, M'ata sufficiently low (negative) value. Note that by setting =i=8+n+r
the authorities can follow the Friedman rule for Pareto-efficiency (satiation in real money
balances) and achieve the inflation target at the same time.
The analysis is not affected in any material way when the initial value and subsequent
growth rates of the nominal money stock are the monetary policy instrument and the short
nominal bond rate becomes endogenous. This is most easily seen when both the growth rate
of capacity output and the growth rate of the nominal money stock are constant at ff and
respectively.Under this monetary rule, the inflation rate is given by
if 8+p￿i
—lM(S+fl) ifö+Ji<LM
Itfollows that an inflation target below 1M— (8 + n)cannot be achieved. It also
follows that by setting a sufficiently negative nominal interest rate on currency, any inflation
target can be achieved.
The liquidity trap in the Keynesian variant
In the Keynesian variant, output is demand-determined, the price level and the rate of
inflation are assumed to be predetermined, and the rate of inflation adjusts to the gap between





For simplicity, we assume capacity output to be exogenous and constant.
Monetary policy
The monetary authorities are again assumed to peg the nominal interest rate on
currency exogenously
=
Weassume in what follows that the other monetary instrument is the short nominal
interest rate on bonds, rather than the level or the growth rate of the nominal money stock.
There are two reasons for this. First, it simplifies the exposition. Second, it is how monetary
policy is actually conducted.The monetary authorities are assumed to follow a simplified Taylor rule for the short
nominal interest rate on non-monetary financial claims, as long as this does not put the short
nominal bond rate below the interest rate on currency. A standard Taylor rule for the short
nominal bond rate which restricts the short nominal bond rate not to be below the short
nominal rate on currency, would be
i=1+yr+y if i+yr+i ￿1M
if i+pr+y <IM
For our purposes, all that matters is the responsiveness of the short bond rate to the
inflation rate. We therefore omit feedback from the level of real GDP (or from the output




The Taylor rule is sometimes justified as a simple, ad-hoc rule consistent with
inflation targeting. If the target rate of inflation is constant at r * (and equal to the steady-







The behaviour of the economy can be summarised in two first-order differential
equations in the non-predetermined state variable c and the predetermined state variable r.






Whenthe liquidity trap constraint is not binding (we shall refer to this as the 'normal'
case), saddlepoint stability for the dynamic system requires y > 1. A higher rate of inflation
leads, through the policy reaction function, to a larger increase in the short nominal bond rate
so as to raise the short real rate. As shown in Figure 10, the ê =0locus in the normal case
(denoted (= 0)N)'isvertical in a phase diagram with r on the horizontal axis and c on the
vertical axis, at = = *• 24
1—y
Figure 10 here
In the liquidity trap regime, the ê =0locus (denoted (è =O)L)isvertical at
2r=i —8. With M=0,the locus (è—O)L is to the left of (=0)N. This is the case we
shall be considering as the benchmark henceforth.
As long as the rate of inflation exceeds 1M
—
, theshort nominal bond rate exceeds
7
the short nominal interest rate on currency, and the economy is in the normal regime. For
inflation rates at or below 1M
—1
, theeconomy is in the liquidity trap regime. The switch
7
24 andin what follows we ignore the c =0segment of the c isocline.from the normal to the liquidity trap regime occurs at= =8y
1] *We
shall refer to the boundary of the normal and the liquidity trap locus as the LN locus in Figure
10. Taking again as our reference point the situation where M= 0and noting that 8> 0 and
that y >1,we need only assume that the target inflation rate r *isnonnegative, for the
switching value of r to lie between the two è =0loci. This is assumed in Figure 10 and
thereafter. The LN locus could either be to the left or to the right of the caxis.
The steady state of the model is as follows. There are two steady states (the normal
one and the liquidity trap one) for the nominal bond rate and the rate of inflation. The normal










When y >1,as we assume throughout, the equilibrium configuration in the
neighbourhood of the normal steady state is a saddlepoint.
The linear approximation of the normal dynamics at c= ëand r =is
[e1J(r_1)_8 (y_1)1[c—
,8 0j[if_




The determinant of the state matrix is (1— —g)/3<0if y >1.The two
characteristic roots are —1)(
—g).
The normal steady state configuration inFigure 10 illustrates the saddlepoint
property of the normal steady state.
From (34) and the normal version of (35) it follows that the slope of the integral
curves in c— 7rspace is given by
dc [I—8+(y—1),r}c
drfl(c+g-5)
Thiscan be rewritten as
fl(1+3)dc={[_5+(_1),r]dr
As this is separable in c and 'r, it can be integrated to yield
2+k
where k is an arbitrary constant of integration.
Provided (Tb)2 +2(1—y)(k—J3[c+(g—y)lnc])￿0,






The equilibrium configuration near the liquidity trap steady stateinFigure 10) is






The liquidity trap steady state is a center.25 Some neighbourhood of this steady state is
completely filled by closed integral curves, each containing the steady state in its interior.
Figure 10 also shows the behaviour of the system near the liquidity trap steady state.
At a common level of consumption, the slope of the integral curve in the normal case,
N




boundary of the two regimes (when=
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Wewant to consider shocks for which the liquidity trap can be sprung, that is, shocks
for which the constraint j i becomes binding. In our model that has to be either a demand
shock or a supply shock that lowers current aggregate demand below current capacity output.
As regards demand shocks, the simplest candidate in our model is the unexpected
announcement, at time t=t0ofa future increase in public spending, g, starting at t1>t0.For
simplicity, we will treat the expected future increase in public spending as permanent.
An anticipated future increase in public spending is contractionary between the
announcement date (to)andthe implementation date (tj)becauseforward-looking Ricardian
households realise that higher future public spending means a higher present discounted valueof future taxes. Human capital falls and with it private consumption. Because of the Taylor-
style interest rate reaction function, the profile of expected future short real rates is actually
lower with the public spending shock than without. Future after-tax endowments are
therefore discounted at a lower rate, but this is not enough to negate the negative effect on
aggregate demand.26. Essentially the same results obtain when we consider the unexpected
announcement of a lower future path of capacity output. This was the main shock considered
by Krugman [1998d]. Figure 11 represents the behaviour of the system following the public
spending shock.
Figure 11 here
Assume the system starts in steady state at the normal steady state equilibrium c,
withgovernment spending expected to be constant. An unanticipated, immediate, permanent
increase in public spending will result in an immediate transition to the new steady state at
Inthe new steady state, the rate of inflation, and all real and nominal interest rates are
the same as before. The level of private consumption has fallen by the same amount as the
level of public consumption has increased.
When the increase in public consumption is not immediate, the transition is as
follows. Assume that at the announcement date, to,thereis news of a future permanent
increase in public spending, starting at tj> t. Theincrease in public spending, when it
occurs, is of the same magnitude as the immediate increase in public spending analysed
25 Anne Sibert provided the mathematical solution and graphical representation for the
behaviour of the system in the liquidity trap zone.
26 If instead of the logarithmic instantaneous utility function we had adopted the constant
elasticity of marginal utility function with an intertemporal substitution elasticity larger than
1, the negative effect on consumption would have been reinforced.earlier. We shall refer to tj as the implementation date. For a 'moderate' postponement in
the implementation of the public spending increase (defined below), private consumption
drops immediately (on the announcement date to)to ,say.The reason again is that a
higher sequence of future taxes is anticipated by the Ricardian consumers, immediately upon
the announcement of the future spending increase. Human capital falls and with it private
consumption, albeit by less that when the public spending increase was immediate. Between
the announcement date, to, and the implementation date, tj,consumptionand inflation both
fall gradually as the system moves from to ,whereit arrives at tj when the public
spending increase in actually implemented. From tj on, the system moves along the
convergent saddlepath through the new steady state (f ),fromctothe new steady state
at ￿'
The initial jump in the level of consumption at t is such as to place the system on that
divergent trajectory, drawn with reference to the initial steady state, that will put it on the
unique continuously convergent trajectory through the new steady state, , atthe moment
the public spending increase is actually implemented (at the implementation date tj). Note
that the rate of inflation is assumed to be predetermined in the Keynesian version of the
model.
A moderate delay in the public spending increase in defined by the requirement that
the intersection of the disequilibrium trajectory drawn with reference to the initial steady
state, and the saddlepath through the new steady state, be at a level of inflation greater than or
equal than the one that triggers the liquidity trap. In Figure 11 this means that the
disequilibrium trajectory passing through is the trajectory with the longest gap between
the announcement of the future spending increase and its implementation that is consistentwith the system not ending up in the liquidity trap region. This solution trajectory intersects
the convergent saddlepath through f￿ at Q, which corresponds to an inflation rate equal
to ,whichseparates the normal region from the liquidity trap region.
With any longer postponement of the public spending increase, the initial drop in
consumption would be to, say, c￿inFigure 11. From there the system would travel along
the divergent trajectory drawn with reference to that would bring it to on the LN
locus some time before tj.Thesystem would then switch to the closed orbit, drawn with
reference tothat passes through Q .Itwould travel in clockwise fashion around this
orbit until tj.Assumethat at tjithas arrived at c. Attj, itwould switch (without a
discontinuous jump in either corir)tothe closed orbit drawn with reference to the new
liquidity trap steady state (￿ )thatpasses through c￿. Ifthis orbit (labelled aco)stays
entirely within the liquidity trap domain (that is, if this orbit does not cross the LN locus) the
system would continue to circumnavigate the new liquidity trap steady state on this closed
orbit. This is the case drawn in Figure 11. If the aw orbit leaves the liquidity trap domain
again, the behaviour of the system becomes very hard to pin down. It is possible that no
equilibrium exists in this case.
In the Keynesian case also, it is clear how a reduction in the nominal interest rate on
currency, M' can help avoid a liquidity trap. A lower value of 1M shifts both the (= 0)L
locus and the boundary separating the liquidity trap region from the normal region (the LL
locus) to the left. For any shock to demand or supply, it is always possible to find a value of
1M low enough to stop the economy from entering the liquidity trap region.
Furthermore, if the economy were to get caught in the liquidity trap region, an
unexpected permanent reduction in the nominal interest rate on currency could always land itback in the normal region. Cutting the nominal rate on currency can therefore be cure as well
as prevention.27
(V) Conclusion
The credible targeting of a low rate of inflation should result, on average, in low
nominal interest rates. The administratively determined zero nominal interest rate on
currency sets a floor under the nominal interest rate on non-monetary financial claims. An
important policy issue then is the following: how likely is it that the economy ends up, as a
result of shocks or endogenous fluctuations, in a situation where the zero short nominal
interest floor becomes a binding constraint, that is, how likely is the economy to end up in a
liquidity trap?
If low average nominal interest rates also tend to be stable rates, the risk of ending up
in a liquidity trap need not be enhanced much by targeting a low rate of inflation. The
empirical evidence on the relationship between the level and volatility of short nominal rates
is, however, mixed. The cross-sectional evidence supports a strong positive correlation. The
27 A very similar, but technically more complicated, analysis can be conducted for the case
where the growth rate of the nominal money stock rather than the short nominal bond rate is
the monetary instrument. When the growth rate of nominal money is the exogenous
monetary instrument, the equations of motion of the economic system can be summarised as
follows: When j >i,wehave the following three-dimensional dynamic system.
d(c'\ . c c
dtm) m m
=(M+77---—8—7Z•)c
= /3(c + g-j7)
Note that when i =1Mand the economy is stuck in a liquidity trap, the dynamic
system reduces to
—5—ff)c
= /3(c + g-time-series evidence for the UK is ambiguous, but if anything is consistent with a weak
negative correlation.
Once an economy lands itself in a liquidity trap, there are just two policy options.
The first is to wait for some positive shock to the excess demand for goods and services,
brought about through expansionary fiscal measures or through exogenous shocks to private
domestic demand or to world demand. The second option is to lower the zero nominal
interest rate floor on currency by taxing currency. A negative interest rate on currency would
also reduce the likelihood of an economy landing itself in a liquidity trap.
The paper revisits a proposal by Gesell for implementing a negative nominal interest
rate on currency. The transactions and administrative costs associated with what amounts to
periodic currency reforms would be non-negligible. Such currency conversion costs could be
reduced by lengthening the interval between conversions, but they would remain significant.
These 'shoe-leather costs' would have to be set against the risk of ending up in a liquidity trap,
if a very low rate of inflation is targeted without taxing currency, or against the cost of
targeting a higher rate of inflation.28 It may take a lot of shoe leather to fill an output gap or
to rub out the distortions of a higher inflation tax. If there are indeed benighted countries
threatened by, or even caught in, a liquidity trap, the policy makers there have one more
optiontheymightwishtoconsider onitsmerits:Gesellmoney.
which is the same as the liquidity trap-constrained dynamics when the short nominal bond
rate was the policy instrument.28 Onthe costs of even low rates of inflation see Feldstein [1997], Tödter and Ziebarth [1997]
and Chadha, Haldane and Janssen [1998]. On the costs and benefits of low inflation see
Akerlof, Dickens and Perry [1996]. For a general survey see Fischer [1994].Appendix 1: Paying Negative Nominal Interest Rates; Some Further
Considerations.
In this section, we ignore uncertainty and time is measured in discrete periods of unit
length.
is the one-period nominal interest rate between periods tandt+1. At time t,asecurity
obliging the issuer to pay the holder (owner) 1 unit of money in period t+i, i =1,...,N,will be




This pricing formula makes sense, for finite N, as long as>—1,for all t: the price
of money tomorrow in terms of money today, D,N,orthe N-period nominal discount factor,
cannot be negative. The sequence of interest rates can, however be negative. A negative one-
period interest rate simply means that 1 £ tomorrow is worth more than 1f today: the discount
factor exceeds 1. As N —cc, theinfinite sequence of single-period nominal interest rates
cannot all be negative, lest the discount factor become unbounded. A consol or perpetuity
with a constant positive coupon would have an infinite price if the infinite sequence of period
rates were negative.
Assume that a borrower issues, at time t,asecurity committing him to pay the lender
(the owner or holder of the security) Ct+] ￿ 0 units of money in periods t+i, i =1N. The
price of the security in period t, V" is
VN—D'C+1
Assumethe purchase price is paid by the lender in period t. The problem for the
lender now becomes to enforce payment of the coupons, C+1, by the borrower in each of theN periods after the security is issued. Unless we can rely on borrower honesty, or unless the
lender and borrower are locked into an infinitely repeated lender-borrower relationship, a
necessary condition for performance by the borrower is that the lender knows the identityof
the borrower. The borrower need not know the identity of the lender, because the borrower
has already received all he wants out of the relationship: money up front. To enforce
performance on the contract by the borrower, once the present discounted value to the
borrower of the continuation of the relationship has become negative, the lender must be able
to identify the borrower to a third party enforcement agency (the courts).
Conventional bearer bonds are therefore incentive-compatible. The anonymous
holder of the bearer bond knows the identity of the issuer and it is the issuer who owes money
to the holder of the bearer bond. It is of course key that there is a way to establish whether
coupon payments have in fact been made. With bearer bonds, negotiableinstruments that can
change hands freely, the security must be marked unambiguously as 'current' in regard to all
payments due. Without such clear and unambiguous marking, the same bearer bond couldbe
presented again and again for payment by the same or by different anonymous holders.
Clipping coupons off a bearer bond is a time-honoured technology for establishing whether
payments due have indeed been made.
I restrict the discussion to pure fiat currency, which does not have intrinsic value
either as a consumption good or as a capital good. A useful way of viewing currency is as an
IOU of the state that has a one-period maturity, pays no interest, but can be redeemed at par
after one period. Each unit of the 'old' currency is returned to the issuer after one period in
exchange for one unit of 'new' currency which is identical in all respects to the old currency.
In particular, it is impossible to determine whether a given imit of currency is new or old.
Note that this makes one-period currency redeemable at par for indistinguishable newcurrency equivalent to a zero coupon bearer perpetuity or consol. The value of one unit of
currency as a store of value is therefore, in period t,
1
+ it,t+l
Currency,of course, yields further utility services (as a means of payment and
medium of exchange). The value of the flow of non-pecuniary returns in period t(measured
in terms of currency) will be denoted v(M), where M denotes the nominal stock of
currency. The total, pecuniary and non-pecuniary value of an additional unit of currency




Interest-bearing currency involves replacing the assumption that one unit of currency
can be exchanged for 1 unit of identical currency after one period, with the assumption that
one unit of currency can be exchanged for l+Nf units of identical currency after one period.
The value of the interest-bearing currency is therefore
v'(M1)+
1 +
Clearly,if M ￿ 0, money's bearer-bond status remains consistent with incentive-
compatible enforcement of the terms of the contract. The anonymous lender (the holder of
the bearer bond) knows the identity of the borrower (the state through its agent, the central
bank), who owes the lender money. The anonymous party can be relied upon to claim the
positive interest due. The problem of marking currency when interest has been paid will of
course be present, as with all bearer bonds. Coupons will have to be clipped off currency or
currency will have to be stamped.
When the interest rate on money is negative, the anonymous party is also the party
who owes money to the known party. This presents a problem in that the anonymous bearermay try to avoid paying interest due to the borrower simply by not turning up to have the
currency stamped or have non-detachable coupons attached to it. If private agents continue
among themselves to exchange (and accept in payment) old but unstamped money and new or
stamped money at par, the attempt to pay negative interest on money would be vitiated. The
issuer (the state) has to be able to force the bearer of its currency liabilities to come forward
to pay the 'tax on currency'. Tax enforcement when the tax authorities do not know the
identity of the tax payer is problematic. The only solution is, first, to make currency on
which interest has been paid clearly distinguishable from currency on which interest has not
been paid (by stamping or attaching coupons to it) and second, to penalise those holders of
currency who are in arrears. The simplest penalty would be partial or completeconfiscation
of currency on which interest payments are not current.Appendix 2: A Time-Series Investigation of the Association Between the
Level and Volatility of the Short Nominal Interest Rate, the Inflation Rate
and the Exchange Rate Depreciation Rate.
(1) UK 3-month interbank rate 1975-1 999.
Let i denote the UK 3-month interbank rate. The time series model estimated for
Table 1 was
— 4-1=a+ bi1 +
= +Ut + 9u11,
2 2 (A2.1)
E(e1IW1)= O,E(s, j'P11) =
= w+flo1 +y +&
Thistime series model includes AR(1) and MA(]) terms in the conditional mean
equation to account for the autocorrelation of standardisedresiduals.It includes
GARCH(1, 1) terms in the conditional variance equation to account for the autocorrelation of
squared standardised residuals, as well as, a linear function of the lagged interest rate level to
capture the potential dependence of the conditional variance on the lagged interest ratelevel.
Weekly data of the UK 3-month interbank rate from Jan 75 to April 99 were used for
the model estimation. The estimation results using maximum likelihood were:Table A2.1
Coefficient Std. Error Prob
a 0.047 0.0300.119
b—0.0062 0.00380.103
p 0.86 0.06 0.000






Standard errors are estimated using Quasi Maximum Likelihood. The estimates of the
parameters are consistent even if the conditional normality assumption isviolated. They can,
however, be inefficient.
The coefficient 8, that determines the dependence of the conditional variance on the
lagged interest rate level is insignificant. Alternative models of the conditional variancethat
include higher order powers or higher order lags of the lagged interest rate level, were also
estimated.29 The coefficients of the higher order powers or higher order lags of the interest
rate level were also insignificant. Therefore, the dependence of the conditional variance on
past interest rate levels is weak.
However, the ex-post contemporaneous relationship between the interest rate level i
and the conditional variance o- is strong. In fact the two variables have a correlation of 0.66.
This is mainly because of the large information shocks in 1970's and 1980's when short
interest rates were high. After the introduction of inflation targeting in UK (in late 92) the
29 includesa version replacing the conditional variance equation in (A2.l) by
=w +flo+ye+8i, a specification suggested by Chan, Karolyi, Longstaff
and Sanders [19921.relationship between the interest rate level i1 and the conditional variance oisweaker. In
fact they are slightly negatively correlated, with a correlation coefficient of -0.26.
The steady state forecast of the level of the 3-month interbank rate is 7.546. The 95%
confidence intervals are 4.02 and 14.41. The confidence intervals were constructed by
assuming that the standardised steady state forecast follows the in-sample distribution of the
standardised residuals which, of course, has finite support. In particular the assumed
skewness and kurtosis were 0.846 and 10.49 respectively.
Using ln(1 +i1)rather than i as the specification of the interest rate variable in the
regressions did not result in significantly different results.
(2) UK base rate 1800-1998:
Let i denote the UK base rate. The time series model estimated was an EGARCH
model of the form:
—i-1=a + bi_1+e,,
= + U +
E(eI'P,_1) =0,E(eIP1_1)= o, (A2.2)
log(o)=+fllog(1)+a--'-+
0.1_i 0.€i
The coefficients a and y capture the potentially asymmetric impact of last periods
shocks on conditional variance.
The time series model also includes AR(10) and MA(2) terms in the conditional
mean equation to account for the autocorrelation of standardised residuals.
Annual data for the UK base rate from 1800 to 1998 were used for estimation. The
estimation results using maximum likelihood were:Table A2.2
Coefficient Std. Error Prob
a 0.34 0.11 0.002
b —0.071 0.0230.002
p 0.12 0.07 0.099
9 —0.28 0.08 0.000
w —0.064 0.086 0.45 5
0.29 0.07 0.000
/3 0.91 0.02 0.000
a 0.078 0.1020.446
R2 (adjusted) =0.120
Standard errors are estimated using Quasi Maximum Likelihood. The estimates of the
parameters are asymptotically consistent even if the conditional normality assumptionis
violated. They can be inefficient, however, in this case.
The EGARCH model was chosen over alternative GARCH models, because its long
run unconditional variance was non-explosive30. The coefficient ' is significant3t,but the
effect is the opposite of the "leverage32" effect, that is, a negative shock has a negative impact
on the conditional variance.
The steady state forecast of the base rate is 4.88. The 95% confidence intervals are 1.02 and
10.1. The confidence intervals were constructed by assuming that the standardised steady
state forecast follows the in-sample distribution of the standardised residuals. In particular the
assumed skewness and kurtosis were 0.49 and 4.197 respectively.
(3) UK annual inflation (RN annual % changes) 1800-1998:
30 An asymmetric component ARCH model had also a non-explosive unconditional variance,
but the convergence was much slower than EGARCH model.
at 95% confidence level.Let p denote the RPI and ir1 =Pt
—
its annual proportional rate of change. The
Pt-i
time series model estimated was
— a + bit1+
= Pit-S P2 t-8'
E(e1IP11)= 0,E(e'P11) =o,
Q2 =a)+fl(71+ye1
Thistime series model includes AR(5)andAR(8) terms in the conditional mean
equation to account for the autocorrelation of standardised residuals.It includes
GARCH(1,1) terms in the conditional variance equation to account for the autocorrelation of
squared standardised residuals.
Annual data of the UK RN annual proportional changes from 1800 to 1998 were used
for the model estimation. The estimation results using maximum likelihood were:
Table A2.3
Coefficient Std. Error Prob
a 0.013 0.006 0.03 1
b —0.46 0.08 50.000
p1 0.15 0.08 0.053
p2 0.24 0.08 0.00 1
w0.000090.000103 0.380
fi 0.81 0.12 0.000
0.16 0.1040.114
R2 (adjusted) =0.294
Standard errors are estimated using Quasi Maximum Likelihood. The estimates of the
parameters are asymptotically consistent even if the conditional normality assumptionis
violated. They can be inefficient, however, in this case.
32 The "leverage" effect is the negative correlation between current returns and future
volatility, found mainly in stock returns data.Alternative models of the conditional variance that include inflation rate dependence,
were also estimated. The coefficient of the inflation rate dependence was insignificant.
The steady state forecast of the inflation rate is 2.7%.The95%confidenceintervals
are -10.7% and 21%. The confidence intervals were constructed by assumingthat the
standardised steady state forecast follows the in-sample distribution of the standardised
residuals.In particular the assumed skewness and kurtosis were 0.434 and 5.286
respectively.
(4) £/$ annual changes 1800-1998:
Let sdenotethe annual spot exchange rate and e=
S1 —its proportional rate of
St-I





= w+/1o +ye +&2
Thistime series model includes AR(2) and MA(3) terms in the conditional mean equation to
account for the autocorrelation of standardised residuals. It includes GARCH(1 ,1)terms in
the conditional variance equation to account for the autocorrelation of squared standardised
residuals, as well as a linear term in the square of the growth rate of the exchange rate to
capture the potential dependence of the conditional variance onthe proportional rate of
change of the exchange rate. Annual data on annual percentage changes of the £I$exchange
rate from 1800 to 1998 were used for the model estimation. The estimation results using
maximum likelihood were:Table A2.4
Coefficient Std. Error Prob
a —0.0059 0.00160.000
b —0.75 0.09 0.000
p —0.18 0.05 0.000
9 —0.25 0.08 0.00 1
o 0.001010.000270.000
/3 0.10 0.06 0.113
y —0.13 0.06 0.034
8 0.89 0.32 0.006
R2 (adjusted) =0.422
The coefficient 8, which measures the dependence of the conditional variance on the
squared proportional exchange rate change is highly significant. The steady stateforecast of
the £/$ annual percentage change is -0.8%. The 95% confidence intervals are -10.6% and
4.2%. The confidence intervals were constructed by assuming that the standardised steady
state forecast follows the in-sample distribution of the standardised residuals. In particular
the assumed skewness and kurtosis were 0.864 and 7.57 respectively.References
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